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We study risk pooling via unidirectional lateral transshipments between two locations under local decision-making. Unidi-
rectional transshipments can be applicable when cost structures and/or capabilities differ between locations, and it is also a
common practice in dual channel supply chains with online and offline sales channels. We show that such a system cannot
be coordinated only with varying transshipment prices. The transshipment receiver orders more and the transshipment giver
orders less than the respective optimal centralised order quantities. In order to remove this discrepancy, we suggest horizontal
coordination mechanisms by introducing a leftover subsidy for the location providing the transshipments or a shortage subsidy
for the location receiving transshipments as well as a combination of shortage and leftover subsidy. Further, we evaluate
the impact of network structure by comparing the equilibrium order quantities and profits under the uni- and bidirectional
systems as well as a system without transshipments. Since demand correlation is a critical aspect in risk pooling we provide
a detailed numerical study to discuss its impact on our findings.
Keywords: one-way transshipments; decentralisation; horizontal coordinating contracts; risk pooling; demand correlation
1. Introduction
Risk pooling via transshipments, i.e. serving excess demand at one location with excess inventory at another location, is
a well-known concept in inventory management routinely performed in a variety of industries (Dong and Rudi 2004). It
increases overall profitability of the supply chain through balancing locations’demand with available inventories by shipping
excess stock to locations that face stockouts. In many practical situations, however, an asymmetric structure in the supply
chain can be observed such that transshipments can be performed only unidirectional.
For example, in the online to offline supply channel studied by Seifert, Thonemann, and Sieke (2006) and He, Zhang,
and Yao (2014) the traditional retailer can transship to the online shop. The other way around is not possible, since in-store
customers in contrast to online customers are not willing to wait a certain shipment time. Unidirectional transshipments
may also occur when it is not profitable for one location to sell excess stock to another location. Reasons can be high
differences between the locations in shortage cost, size and/or proximity to transport hubs (see e.g. Axsäter 2003; Dong, Xu,
and Evers 2012; Kranenburg and Van Houtum 2009; Olsson 2010). There might also exist a pre-specified redistribution route
of transshipping items among the locations implying unidirectional transshipments (see Bouma and Teunter 2014, 2016). In
order to offer transshipments a location must also enable transparency and invest in information systems to share information
on inventories. If one location is not willing to do so, this can also imply unidirectional transshipments (Liang et al. 2014).
Another example is the humanitarian supply chain within the network of the United Nation Humanitarian Response Depot.
Humanitarian organisations that are members of the network can store relief items in the depots of the network that can be
shared with each other in an asymmetric way, i.e. member can benefit from transshipments while stocking their own relief
items outside of the network (Toyasaki et al. 2017). Unidirectional transshipments can also be interpreted by one-way product
substitution in the inventory system if only the higher quality product may be substituted by a lower quality product that is
not in inventory (Axsäter 2003).
Typically in the literature it is assumed that inventories are managed centrally (see e.g. Ahmadi, Torabi, and Tavakkoli-
Moghaddam 2016; Bouma and Teunter 2016; Dong and Rudi 2004; Nakandala, Lau, and Shum 2017; Smirnov and Gerchak
2014; Tagaras 1989). In practice, however, transshipments often take place with independent locations maximising their own
profits (Rudi, Kapur, and Pyke 2001). Motivated by practical examples, we assume that the different locations are not owned
by one firm, i.e. they make decentralised decisions where each location reacts optimally in terms of the other location’s given
inventory level. Thereby, for example, a transshipment price can be determined that coordinates the decentralised supply
chain for bidirectional transshipments (see e.g. Rudi, Kapur, and Pyke 2001).
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Figure 1. Illustration of decentralised supply chain structures under consideration.
In this paper, we study the risk pooling effect of unidirectional transshipments with two independently owned and
operated locations selling identical products. Although unidirectional transshipments can be considered as a special case
of bidirectional transshipments if the model assumptions are general enough (see e.g. Tagaras and Cohen 1992), following
Axsäter (2003) we reduce the complexity of the model of mutual beneficial transshipments by removing the unneeded
transshipment link. This allows us to derive analytical results specifically on unidirectional transshipments and to provide
a direct comparison to bidirectional transshipments and to the no pooling case where each location fulfils their demands
separately (see Figure 1). Our focus is on industries with high demand uncertainty, long lead times and short selling season,
i.e. newsvendor type models.
In particular, the aim of this paper is to discuss the performance of unidirectional transshipments compared to bidirectional
transshipments and no transshipments under decentralised decision-making. Further, we analyse how the locations choose
inventory levels compared to the centralised (joint profit maximised) solution without any explicit coordination mechanism.
We find that the induced asymmetry of unidirectional transshipments in terms of risk sharing between the locations excludes
coordination in an unidirectional transshipment system. Thus, for such an asymmetric risk pooling situation, an increased
balance of risk sharing between the locations would be necessary in order to minimise the difference to the centralised system.
We propose a combination of transshipment price and leftover and/or shortage subsidy that induce both locations to choose
centralised inventory levels. As another objective of the paper is to discuss the impact of demand correlation – a critical
issue in inventory pooling – we therefore explore how correlation affects the inventory levels and profits under unidirectional
transshipments.
This work is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature. In Section 3 we introduce the models and
discuss the existence of Nash equilibria and when the transshipment prices can coordinate the supply chain. In Section 4 we
introduce contracts with leftover or shortage subsidy that can coordinate the unidirectional supply chain. Numerical examples
are provided in Section 5, and conclusions are summarised in Section 6.
2. Literature
There is extensive literature on risk pooling via inventory transshipments. For a review of research on lateral transshipments
and its classifications we refer to Paterson et al. (2011). An overview on supply chain coordination with contracts is given in
Cachon (2003).
In decentralised systems most literature has focused on bidirectional transshipment in newsvendor-related supply chains.
These papers all assume that transshipments are mutually beneficial among all retailers. Rudi, Kapur, and Pyke (2001) analyse
coordinating transshipment prices and how this affects the optimal inventory orders at each location in a decentralised supply
chain with two locations and bidirectional transshipments. Hu, Duenyas, and Kapuscinski (2007) analyse a two location
inventory model similar to Rudi, Kapur, and Pyke (2001) and show that coordinating transshipment prices do not always
exist. They derive sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of coordinating transshipment prices such as e.g.
symmetric locations. Lee and Park (2016) extend the transshipment models of Rudi, Kapur, and Pyke (2001) and Hu,
Duenyas, and Kapuscinski (2007) by considering uncertain capacity of the supplier. They find that the sufficient condition
for the existence of coordinating transshipment prices is more restrictive under supply capacity uncertainty and limitation
than in the case of infinite capacity.
Li, Sun, and Gao (2013) discuss the coordination problem of preventive bidirectional lateral transshipments between
two independent locations and propose a bidirectional revenue sharing contract to coordinate the system. Zou, Dresner, and
Windle (2010) consider a two-location inventory model with transshipments in a competitive environment. Rivalry intensity
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Table 1. Notation.
ri Selling price at location i
ci Purchasing cost at location i
si Salvage value at location i
pi Shortage penalty cost at location i
ri j Transshipment price per unit transshipped from i to j , paid by j
ci j Transshipment cost per unit transshipped from i to j , paid by i
Qi Order quantity at location i
Di Random demand at location i
ρ Coefficient of correlation between Di and Dj
FX (·) Cumulative distribution function of X
fX (·) Probability density function of X
is assessed through a customer’s switching rate investigating the impact of the switching rate on the performance benefits from
transshipments. Zhao et al. (2016) study coordinated transshipment prices in a new e-commerce model, an online-to-offline
market including a revenue share between online and offline retailer. Li and Li (2017) discuss the impact of bargaining power
in a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two symmetric retailers with bidirectional transshipments
between them.
Literature focusing on unidirectional transshipments in a decentralised supply chain structure, however, is rare. Dong,
Xu, and Evers (2012) study a multi-level framework considering a contract manufacturer and two inventory locations which
differ in scale and scope such that transshipments are performed only unidirectional to analyse information asymmetry within
the context of transshipments. Toyasaki et al. (2017) consider bidirectional and unidirectional transshipment of relief items in
a decentralised humanitarian supply chain under correlated demands. However, since they consider a supply chain network
in the non-commercial setting their model shows significant differences to the commercial setting in terms of cost and price
parameters. For example, in their network transshipments between channels are based on a borrowing and loaning system
without any transshipment price. Further, they consider backup prices for emergency orders from an additional echelon in
the system that can coordinate the supply chain.
Seifert, Thonemann, and Sieke (2006) studies unidirectional transshipments integrating direct and indirect sales channels
through a traditional retail store and a virtual store under decentralised decision-making. They analyse how the supply chain
of a single manufacturer and multiple identical retail stores can be coordinated considering a combination of wholesale price,
inventory subsidy and transfer payment. He, Zhang, and Yao (2014) study a dual channel supply chain with unidirectional
transshipment policies between retailer and manufacturer (online shop) under endogenous and exogenous transshipment
prices. The setting in both papers is somewhat different to our horizontal setting as they consider unidirectional transshipments
between different echelons (i.e. a vertical setting with manufacturer and retailer). In these studies, unidirectional and
bidirectional transshipments are not compared and their analyses are restricted to the assumption that the online shop
serves different customer segments than the traditional retail store such that demands are not correlated. Our objective is to
discuss the efficiency of unidirectional transshipments by comparing it with bidirectional transshipments, no transshipments
and the centralised solution, propose horizontal coordination mechanisms and to investigate how demand correlation affects
the results.
3. Model
Consider a single period model with two locations i, j = 1, 2 (throughout the paper, when using this indexing, we assume
i = j). They face random demands Di with continuous marginal distribution function FDi and the two demands can be
correlated. The marginal and joint distributions of demands are common knowledge. We assume that the distributions are
twice differentiable and strictly increasing on their supports. The product is sold at a selling price ri per unit, purchased at
ci and salvaged at si , where ri > ci > si . Any unmet demand incurs a shortage penalty cost of pi per unit. Transshipments
from i to j incurs a transshipment cost ci j per unit where the transshipment price is ri j per unit. The main focus of this paper
is on the unidirectional system where transshipments are only allowed in one direction, from location 2 to location 1 (see
Figure 1(b)). However, for benchmarking we will also summarise the main results of bidirectional transshipments (Figure
1(a)) and a traditional channel with no risk pooling (Figure 1(c)).
We assume that ci < c j + c ji , si < s j + c ji , and ri + pi < r j + p j + c ji . These conditions guarantee that it is not
beneficial to always purchase and/or salvage through the other location, and to sell to the other location instead of own
customers. In order to assure that transshipments are profitable from location 2 to 1 the transshipment price should be set
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4 E. Arikan and L. Silbermayr
within a specific range, i.e. r21 ∈ [s2 + c21, r1 + p1] where s2 + c21 < r1 + p1. To ensure mutually profitable transshipments
in the bidirectional case, we additionally assume that r12 ∈ [s1 + c12, r2 + p2], where s1 + c12 < r2 + p2 (see Hu, Duenyas,
and Kapuscinski 2007; Rudi, Kapur, and Pyke 2001). The complete notation is summarised in Table 1.
3.1 No risk pooling
If no transshipments at all are possible the problem reduces to the classical newsvendor problem. The expected profit
function is concave and the optimal order quantity of location 1, QNV1 , is defined by the critical ratio cr1 = r1−c1+p1r1−s1+p1 , such
that FD1(QNV1 ) = cr1, and similarly for location 2.
3.2 Risk pooling via transshipments
We assume transshipments from location 2 to 1 are always possible. For given order quantities Q1 and Q2, transshipments
from 2 to 1 is T21 = min((D1 − Q1)+, (Q2 − D2)+). Transshipments from 1 to 2, T12, are only possible in the bidirectional
setting and defined similarly, while in the unidirectional setting T12 = 0. Sales at location 1 are S1 = min(D1, Q1) + T21,
leftovers are L1 = (Q1 − D1 − T12)+, and unsatisfied demand is P1 = (D1 − Q1 − T21)+. Following Huang, Zhou, and
Zhao (2011), we define De1 = D1 + (D2 − Q2)+ as the effective demand for location 1. It includes the initial demand at
location 1 and the unsatisfied demand at location 2. Similarly, Dn1 = D1 − (Q2 − D2)+ is the net demand at location 1,
which is the initial demand minus the part which can be satisfied by location 2. Note that FDe1(Q1) ≤ FD1(Q1) ≤ FDn1 (Q1).
These can be defined similarly for location 2.
When the two locations make their ordering decisions locally, in a decentralised manner, then the expected profit at
location 1 is
1(Q1, Q2) = E(r1S1 + (r12 − c12)T12 − c1Q1 − r21T21 + s1L1 − p1P1), (1)
and defined similarly for location 2.
Since the transaction between the locations is defined only by a per unit transshipment price we call this simple contract
price-only contract.
If the ordering decisions for the two locations are centrally made the total expected profit is
C (Q1, Q2) = E
2∑
i=1
(ri Si − ci j Ti j − ci Qi + si Li − pi Pi ). (2)
3.2.1 Bidirectional transshipments
The setting with bidirectional transshipments has been studied in detail by Rudi, Kapur, and Pyke (2001) and Hu, Duenyas,
and Kapuscinski (2007). In this section we briefly present their main results.
Hu, Duenyas, and Kapuscinski (2007) show that the expected profit under decentralised decision-making is concave in
the order quantities. The first-order condition characterising the optimal order quantity of location 1 Qb1(Q2) is
(r1 − c1 + p1) − (r21 − r12 + c12)FD1(Q1) − (r1 − r21 + p1)FDn1 (Q1)
−(r12 − c12 − s1)FDe1(Q1) = 0. (3)
It can be defined similarly for the optimal order quantity of location 2, Qb2(Q1). By checking the best response functions,
specifically by evaluating ∂Qb1(Q2)/∂Q2 and ∂Qb2(Q1)/∂Q1 it can be shown that under bidirectional transshipments, there
exists a unique Nash equilibrium (Qb1, Qb2).
If the ordering decisions for the two locations are centrally made, then the total expected profit is concave (Rudi, Kapur,
and Pyke, 2001) and the first-order conditions characterising the optimal order quantity QbC1 for location 1 is
(r1 − c1 + p1) − (c12 − r2 + c21 + s2 − p2)FD1(Q1) − (r1 + p1 − c21 − s2)FDn1 (Q1)
−(r2 + p2 − c12 − s1)FDe1(Q1) = 0, (4)
and can be defined similarly for location 2.
Rudi, Kapur, and Pyke (2001) show that the decentralised system can be coordinated by appropriately set transshipment
prices. However, Hu, Duenyas, and Kapuscinski (2007) provide examples which show that such coordinating prices may not
exist in several cases. Especially with increasing asymmetries in the economic parameters for the two locations, coordination
of bidirectional transshipments may not be possible by varying the transshipment prices.
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3.2.2 Unidirectional transshipments
Under the unidirectional setting transshipments are only allowed from location 2 to location 1, i.e. T12 = 0. Total system-wide
profits could be maximised if the ordering decisions are made centrally. Total expected profit under central decision-making
is concave, and the optimal order quantities QuC1 and QuC2 satisfy the first-order conditions
(r1 − c1 + p1) − (c21 + s2 − s1)FD1(Q1) − (r1 + p1 − c21 − s2)FDn1 (Q1) = 0, (5)
(r2 − c2 + p2) − (r2 − r1 + c21 + p2 − p1)FD2(Q2) − (r1 − c21 − s2 + p1)FDe2(Q2) = 0. (6)
If the ordering decisions are made in a decentralised manner expected profits are concave, and the optimal order quantities
Qu1(Q2) and Qu2(Q1) satisfy the first-order conditions
(r1 − c1 + p1) − (r21 − s1)FD1(Q1) − (r1 − r21 + p1)FDn1 (Q1) = 0, (7)
(r2 − c2 + p2) − (r2 − r21 + c21 + p2)FD2(Q2) − (r21 − c21 − s2)FDe2(Q2) = 0. (8)
The existence of the Nash equilibrium is guaranteed by the concavity of the expected profit functions.The Nash equilibrium
can be obtained by solving Equations (7) and (8) simultaneously. Further, in the following proposition we show the uniqueness
of the equilibrium.
Proposition 3.1 Under unidirectional transshipments, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium (Qu1, Qu2).
Please refer to Appendix 1 for the proofs. By comparing Equation (3) with Equations (7) and (8) we can conclude the
following.
Corollary 3.2 The best response function under unidirectional transshipments is smaller than the best response function
under bidirectional transshipments for location 1, and the opposite holds for location 2, i.e. Qu1(Q2) ≤ Qb1(Q2) for all Q2
and Qu2(Q1) ≥ Qb2(Q1) for all Q1.
Further, we can evaluate the impact of the network structure on equilibrium order quantities as follows.
Proposition 3.3 The order quantity of location 2 (transshipment giver) is always larger in the unidirectional setting
compared to the bidirectional setting. On the other hand, the optimal order quantity of location 1 (transshipment receiver)
is always smaller in the bidirectional setting compared to the unidirectional setting, i.e.
(i) Qu2 ≥ Qb2 and Qu1 ≤ Qb1,
(ii) QuC2 ≥ QbC2 and QuC1 ≤ QbC1
Intuitively, the transshipment giver 2 orders more in the unidirectional case since it cannot receive any goods from
location 1 in case of shortages. On the other hand, the transshipment receiver 1 orders more than in the unidirectional case
since it does not have the chance of selling its leftovers to location 2. Additionally, location 1 decreases its order quantity
further because it is expecting higher leftover supply at location 2, consequently higher chance for transshipment.
Unlike the bidirectional setting, the unidirectional system cannot be coordinated with a transshipment price-only contract.
By comparing Equations (7) with (5), and (8) with (6) we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3.4 Under unidirectional transshipments, the optimal order quantity of location 2 (transshipment giver) is
smaller in the decentralised system compared to the centralised system, i.e. Qu2 ≤ QuC2 . On the other hand, the optimal order
quantity of location 1 (transshipment receiver) is larger in the decentralised system compared to the centralised system, i.e.
Qu1 ≥ QuC1 .
In the decentralised setting the transshipment giver orders less than would be optimal under centralised decision-making.
This is because he bears the full risk of leftover supply; hence, he is more conservative and orders less. The transshipment
receiver, on the other hand, orders more than under centralised control as the chance for transshipments is decreased under
decentralised decision-making. Therefore, when transshipments are only allowed in one direction, the system cannot be
coordinated by varying transshipment prices. This is similar to the setting under a wholesale price contract in a two-echelon
system or to the bidirectional transshipment setting of Hu, Duenyas, and Kapuscinski (2007) with asymmetric parameters
between two locations. Limiting transshipments in only one direction causes extreme asymmetry in the system. Therefore,
we next suggest simple and easy to implement mechanisms to enable coordination in this unidirectional setting.
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6 E. Arikan and L. Silbermayr
4. Coordinating unidirectional transshipments
In this section we propose simple contracts with a combination of transshipment price and a leftover and/or shortage subsidy.
Under any of these contracts location 2 would have an incentive to increase the order quantity and as a reaction location 1
would order less. Therefore the discrepancy between the decentralised and centralised order quantities, as discussed in
Proposition 3.4, may be avoided and the supply chain profit can be maximised.
4.1 Coordination with leftover subsidy
Under this contract location 1 pays a subsidy of τ L per unit of leftover in location 2, i.e. the transshipment receiver shares
the risk of leftover supply with the transshipment giver. Note that Seifert, Thonemann, and Sieke (2006) suggest a similar
contract for vertical supply chain coordination in a two echelon system where transshipments occur between manufacturer
and retailer and the contract includes also the wholesale price.
The expected profits with the leftover subsidy mechanism are
L1 (Q2, Q1) = E(r1S1 − r21T21 − c1Q1 + s1L1 − p1P1 − τ L L2), (9)
L2 (Q2, Q1) = E(r2S2 + (r21 − c21)T21 − c2Q2 + (s2 + τ L)L2 − p2P2). (10)
The feasible range for transshipment prices has to be modified to account for the leftover subsidy, r21 ∈ [s2+c21+τ L , r1+ p1].
In this range both profit functions are concave and the optimal order quantities are uniquely defined by the first-order conditions
(r1 − c1 + p1) − (r21 − s1 − τ L)FD1(Q1) − (r1 − r21 + p1 + τ L)FDn1 (Q1) = 0, (11)
(r2 − c2 + p2) − (r2 − r21 + p2 + c21)FD2(Q2) − (r21 − c21 − s2 − τ L)FDe2(Q2) = 0. (12)
By using the same line of arguments as in Proposition 3.1, we can conclude the following.
Proposition 4.1 Under unidirectional transshipments with leftover subsidy, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium
(QL1 , QL2 ) for every contract (r21, τ L).
The total centralised system profit is the same with or without leftover subsidy and the optimal centralised order quantities
(QuC1 , QuC2 ) are found through Equations (5) and (6).
Proposition 4.2 A unique combination of transshipment price and leftover subsidy (r L∗21 , τ L∗) can coordinate the unidi-
rectional system where
r L∗21 = (r1 + p1)
(
1 − FD
e
2
(QuC2 )
FD2(QuC2 )
)
+ (c21 + s2)
FDe2(QuC2 )
FD2(QuC2 )
, (13)
τ L∗ = r L∗21 − (c21 + s2). (14)
We can show that conducting unidirectional transshipments with such a contract is always beneficial for location 2
compared to not engaging in collaboration via transshipments.
Corollary 4.3 In the unidirectional system, the expected proﬁt for location 2 with a leftover subsidy contract is always
larger than the expected proﬁt without risk pooling, i.e. L2 (Q2, Q1) ≥ NV2 (Q2) for all Q2 and Q1.
However, we cannot conclude the same for location 1 which we further discuss in Section 5.2 with a numerical example.
4.2 Coordination with shortage subsidy
Under this contract location 2 pays a subsidy of τ S per unit of shortage in location 1, i.e. the transshipment giver shares the
risk of shortages with the transshipment receiver. The expected profits with the shortage subsidy mechanism are
S1 (Q2, Q1) = E(r1S1 − r21T21 − c1Q1 + s1L1 − (p1 − τ S)P1), (15)
S2 (Q2, Q1) = E(r2S2 + (r21 − c21)T21 − c2Q2 + s2L2 − p2P2 − τ S P1). (16)
The feasible range for transshipment prices has to be modified as, r21 ∈ [s2 + c21, r1 + p1 − τ S]. In this range both profit
functions are concave and the optimal order quantities are uniquely defined by the first-order conditions
(r1 − c1 + p1 − τ S) − (r21 − s1)FD1(Q1) − (r1 − r21 + p1 − τ S)FDn1 (Q1) = 0, (17)
(r2 − c2 + p2) − (r2 − r21 + p2 + c21 − τ S)FD2(Q2) − (r21 − c21 − s2 + τ S)FDe2(Q2) = 0. (18)
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Proposition 4.4 Under unidirectional transshipments with shortage subsidy, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium
(QS1 , QS2 ) for every contract (r21, τ S).
Proposition 4.5 A unique combination of transshipment price and shortage subsidy (r S∗21 , τ S∗) can coordinate the
unidirectional system where
r S∗21 = (r1 + p1)
1 − FDn1 (QuC1 )
1 − FD1(QuC1 )
+ (c21 + s2)
FDn1 (QuC1 ) − FD1(QuC1 )
1 − FD1(QuC1 )
, (19)
τ S∗ = r1 + p1 − r S21. (20)
Corollary 4.6 In the unidirectional system, the expected proﬁt for location 1 with a shortage subsidy contract is always
larger than the expected proﬁt without risk pooling, i.e. S1 (Q1, Q2) ≥ NV1 (Q1) for all Q2 and Q1.
Therefore, conducting unidirectional transshipments with a shortage subsidy contract is always beneficial for location 1
compared to not engaging in collaboration via transshipments. However this might not hold for location 2.
4.3 Coordination with leftover and shortage subsidy
When the contract terms include either a leftover or a shortage subsidy we can show that the contract can be beneficial for one
of the two locations. Potentially if we design the contract with three terms (r21, τ L , τ S) we can achieve coordination such
that both parties are better off compared to a no-transshipment setting. Expected profits under such a combination contract
are
LS1 (Q2, Q1) = E(r1S1 − r21T21 − c1Q1 + s1L1 − τ L L2 − (p1 − τ S)P1), (21)
LS2 (Q2, Q1) = E(r2S2 + (r21 − c21)T21 − c2Q2 + (s2 + τ L)L2 − p2P2 − τ S P1). (22)
The feasible range for transshipment prices has to be modified as, r21 ∈ [s2 + c21 + τ L , r1 + p1 − τ S]. In this range both
profit functions are concave and the optimal order quantities are uniquely defined by the first-order conditions
(r1 − c1 + p1 − τ S) − (r21 − s1 − τ L)FD1(Q1) − (r1 − r21 + p1 − τ S + τ L)FDn1 (Q1) = 0, (23)
(r2 − c2 + p2) − (r2 − r21 + p2 + c21 − τ S)FD2(Q2) − (r21 − c21 − s2 + τ S − τ L)FDe2(Q2) = 0. (24)
Proposition 4.7 Under unidirectional transshipments with combined leftover and shortage subsidy, there exists a unique
Nash equilibrium (QLS1 , QLS2 ) for every (r21, τ L , τ S).
Since we have three terms for coordinating two decisions there are multiple coordinating contracts, but for a given
transshipment price we can represent the coordinating subsidy terms uniquely.
Proposition 4.8 For a given transshipment price r21, a unique combination of leftover and shortage subsidy (τ S∗, τ L∗)
can coordinate the unidirectional system where
τ S∗ = (FD
n
1
− FD1)(r21FD2 − (c21 + s2)FDe2 − (r1 + p1)(FD2 − FDe2))
FDe2(1 − FD1) − FD2(FDn1 − FD1)
, (25)
τ L∗ = (r1 + p1 − r21 − τ S)
(FD2 − FDe2)
FDe2
. (26)
All the probabilities have to be evaluated at (QuC1 , QuC2 ).
Although we can represent the coordinating subsidy terms for every transshipment price, some of these combinations
might turn out to be infeasible. A coordinating contract is feasible only if the transshipment price r21 satisfies s2 +c21 +τ L ≤
r21 ≤ r1 + p1 − τ S . Since we can fix one of the contract parameters and change the other two accordingly, we can design
a contract with e.g. τ L = 0 and set τ S and r21 as defined in Proposition 4.5. This would give a feasible contract. Hence,
there is at least one contract such that the combination of transshipment price, leftover and shortage subsidy coordinate the
system. So if we design a contract with three parameters including the transshipment price, we can always find a feasible
coordinating contract. For a feasible coordinating contract we should set r L∗21 ≤ r21 ≤ r S∗21 which are defined in (13) and (19).
Next we show that such a contract can be strictly beneficial for both locations whenever there is a chance of utilising
transshipments, i.e. E(T21) > 0. There is no possibility to utilise transshipments only if the demands are perfectly correlated
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and the order quantity of location one is sufficiently large. For example, for identical demands, if Q2 ≤ Q1 transshipments
cannot be an option when ρ = 1. For nonidentical demands, ρ = 1 implies that D2 = aD1 +b with probability one for some
constants a > 0, and b. In that case, if Q2 ≤ aQ1 + b transshipments can never be an option. On the other hand if ρ = 1
and Q1 is not sufficiently large, transshipments can take place for some demand realisations. When the demand correlation
is different than one, there is always a positive probability that the demand in location one is below its inventory level and
the demand in location two is larger than its inventory level, which leads to transshipments. This might obviously not hold
true if the order quantities are set at the bounds of random demand, e.g. Q2 is equal to the lower bound of D2 or Q1 is equal
to the upper bound of D1, in case it is relevant. In the following, for ease of representation, we do not explicitly mention
these boundary situations. First we summarise this discussion in Lemma 4.9 which lead to the following result.
Lemma 4.9 E(T21) = 0 if ρ = 1 and FD1(Q1) ≥ FD2(Q2), otherwise E(T21) > 0.
Proposition 4.10 With a combination of leftover and shortage subsidy there exists at least one feasible coordinating
contract which is beneﬁcial for both locations.
Proof. Let’s define the differences 1(Q1, Q2) = LS1 (Q1, Q2) − NV1 (Q1, Q2) and 2(Q1, Q2) = LS2 (Q1, Q2) −
NV2 (Q1, Q2) for a coordinating combination contract as
1 = E((r1 + p1 − r21)T21 − τ L∗((Q2 − D2)+ − T21) + τ S∗((D1 − Q1)+ − T21)) (27)
2 = E((r21 − c21 − s2)T21 + τ L∗((Q2 − D2)+ − T21) − τ S∗((D1 − Q1)+ − T21)). (28)
Unless ρ = 1 and FD1(Q1) ≥ FD2(Q2), 1 + 2 = (r1 + p1 − c21 − s2)E(T21) > 0 for all (Q1, Q2) that is, total system
profit under a LS contract is always larger than the total newsvendor profits without transshipments. This means at least
one of the differences is always positive. Remember that a contract is feasible and coordinating if r L∗21 ≤ r21 ≤ r S∗21 . When
r21 = r L∗21 , we know from Corollary 4.3 that 2 ≥ 0, but 1 might be negative. We also know that if we increase r21 to
r S∗21 , 1 becomes positive. So, when we increase r21 within the feasible (coordinating) range 2 starts positive and might
become negative, and 1 might start negative and becomes positive. Since we assume continuous distribution functions,
the two differences are also continuous, so they should cross at least once at a specific point. Since 1 + 2 > 0, the two
differences should strictly be larger than zero at the crossing point.
When ρ = 1 and FD1(Q1) ≥ FD2(Q2), T21 = 0 for all realizations of demands, and 1 = 2 = 0. In this case, there is
no contract which can improve the system profit. Although the two locations cannot make strictly positive benefit, they are
also not worse off than the standard newsvendor setting.
Note that this result does not depend on any assumptions about random demands. The two previously discussed contracts
with either one of the subsidy terms are beneficial for both locations only in a limited range of correlations (see Section 5.2).
Under the combination contract we can find coordinating terms which are beneficial for both locations for every correlation
level.
4.4 Impact of demand correlation
Although it is not possible to derive general monotonicity results with respect to demand correlation, in the following we
study the impact of two extreme cases on optimal order quantities. The results depend on the symmetry of cost parameters
and their impact on the critical ratios cr (see Section 3.1) of the two locations. When the correlation coefficient is one, then
the optimal order quantities under unidirectional transshipments are equal to the optimal newsvendor quantities if the cost
parameters are symmetric or if they are asymmetric such that cr2 ≤ cr1. Otherwise, the optimal order quantity of location
1 (2) under unidirectional transshipments is less (more) than the optimal newsvendor quantity. On the other hand when
correlation coefficient is minus one, then the optimal order quantity of location 1 (2) under unidirectional transshipments
is less (more) than the optimal newsvendor quantity independent of the cost parameters. This relation holds both for the
centralised setting and the decentralised setting. The following proposition summarises these results.
Proposition 4.11
(i) If ρ = 1 and cr2 ≤ cr1 then Qu1 = QuC1 = QNV1 and Qu2 = QuC2 = QNV2 .
(ii) If ρ = 1 and cr2 > cr1 then QuC1 ≤ Qu1 ≤ QNV1 and QNV2 ≤ Qu2 ≤ QuC2 .
(iii) If ρ = −1 then QuC1 ≤ Qu1 ≤ QNV1 and QNV2 ≤ Qu2 ≤ QuC2 if cr2 > cr1.
The implications for the contract terms are as follows: When ρ = 1 and cr2 ≤ cr1 the decentralised order quantities are
equal to the centralised ones. Hence there is no need for any subsidy terms, or we can say both terms τ S∗ and τ L∗ have to
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be zero. When ρ = 1 and cr2 > cr1 or ρ = −1, at least one of the terms has to be positive for coordination, and the optimal
order quantity of location 1 (2) turns out to be less (more) than the optimal newsvendor quantity.
5. Numerical examples
To obtain insights into the impact of general demand correlation on order quantities and the performance of unidirectional
transshipments we consider the three supply chain structures (a), (b), and (c) shown in Figure 1 and also compare it to
a centralised distribution. We use simulation to derive centralised order quantities, Nash-equilibria and expected profits.
Optimal order quantities are obtained by simulating 100,000 correlated demand pairs to obtain point estimates of expected
profits for given order quantities and solve the underlying optimisation problems.
To avoid the chance of negative product demand we assume that individual demands are gamma distributed (k, θ)
with k = 4 and θ = 25. Hence, mean demands are 100 and coefficient of variations 0.5. The dependence among individual
demands is captured by correlation coefficient ρ ∈ (−1, 1). We are interested in the effect of both positive and negative
demand correlation on the risk pooling benefit and the performance measures in the supply chain under unidirectional
transshipments. For example, positive demand correlation can be caused if both demands are strongly affected by common
external conditions such as economic conditions or weather changes. Negative demand correlations, on the other hand, may
rather be caused through competition.
For our base parameters we adopt the price and cost parameters from Rudi, Kapur, and Pyke (2001) as follows. The
selling price for each firm ri = 40, purchasing cost per unit ci = 20, salvage value si = 10, shortage penalty cost pi = 0 and
transshipment cost ci j = 2. Note that in this case based on our assumptions we vary the transshipment price ri j ∈ [12, 40] in
the price-only contract, since otherwise transshipments would not be profitable. The numerical experimentation will focus
on the scenarios of symmetric locations, but we also discuss the impact of asymmetric shortage penalty cost with p1 > p2
on the results.
5.1 Price-only contract
First, we analyse the risk pooling effect of unidirectional transshipment for the transshipment price-only contract. The figures
are based on the scenario of symmetric locations where a coordinating transshipment price for bidirectional transshipments
exists.
5.1.1 Impact of transshipment price and demand correlation on response functions
Figure 2 shows the order quantity response functions of the two locations under bidirectional and unidirectional transshipments
for low, medium and high transshipment prices. The response functions decrease in the other location’s order quantity, since
it reduces the chance of transshipment to the other location while increasing the chance of receiving excess stock from the
other location (see Proposition 3.1).
As discussed in Proposition 3.2, comparing response functions of the unidirectional case with those of the bidirectional
case we see that Qb1(Q2) ≥ Qu1(Q2) and Qb2(Q1) ≤ Qu2(Q1). Consequently, the transshipment receiver’s (location 1) order
quantity is lower while the transshipment giver’s (location 2) order quantity is higher under unidirectional transshipment than
under bidirectional transshipments. However, since the risk pooling effect of the transshipments decreases with increasing
demand correlation ρ, also the discrepancies between bidirectional and unidirectional response functions and equilibria
decrease with increasing demand correlation. Note that as correlation coefficient approaches 1 the risk pooling effect
disappears and the order quantities approach the newsvendor solutions.
In Figure 2(a) and (b) where ri j = 12 location 2 has no benefit from transshipment in the unidirectional transshipment
case, hence, its optimal order quantity is equal to the newsvendor solution. For location 1, on the other hand, it is profitable
to order less than the newsvendor solution as Q2 increases, since cheap transshipment units are available if ρ < 1. Figure
2(c) and (d) show the case where both locations benefit from transshipments in the unidirectional case; location 1 benefits
through received transshipments and location 2 through reduced leftovers. Consequently, both locations order more than in
(a) and (b) respectively. In Figure 2(e) and (f) where the transshipment price is high, unidirectional transshipments are only
slightly beneficial for location 1, i.e. it orders close to the newsvendor solution.
5.1.2 Impact of transshipment price and demand correlation on equilibrium quantities and proﬁts
Figure 3 shows the comparison of decentralised and centralised optimal order quantities for the bidirectional and unidirectional
supply chain structures. We see that in the bidirectional case the intersection of centralised and decentralised order quantities,
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Figure 2. Response functions and equilibria under bi- and unidirectional transshipments.
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Figure 3. Optimal order quantity comparison.
i.e. the coordinated transshipment price increases as demand correlation increases (see also Rudi, Kapur, and Pyke 2001,
Figure 5). Note, as discussed in Hu, Duenyas, and Kapuscinski (2007) for the case of asymmetric retailers the coordinating
transshipment price only exists for a small range of parameters since the existence is only guaranteed if the optimal newsvendor
quantities are both nongreater or nonsmaller than the optimal centralised order quantities. For example, we find that if p1 = 5
and p2 = 0, a coordinating transshipment price in the bidirectional case only exists for ρ < −0.4.
In the unidirectional case, the transshipment price cannot coordinate the system. Under decentralised control location
1 is ordering significantly more than under centralised control. Location 1 cannot expect to receive as many transshipment
as under centralised control, because location 2 is more conservative with respect to order quantities than under centralised
control, i.e. it orders less since he bears the full risk of leftover supply. As Figure 3 indicates, the differences of decentralised
and centralised order quantities in the unidirectional case decrease with increasing demand correlation.
Figure 4 illustrates the impact of increasing demand correlation on the profit increase from uni- or bidirectional trans-
shipments, i.e. (u) or (b)i = ((u) or (b)i −NVi )/NVi for low, medium and high transshipment prices. The profit increase
is always positive, even under high demand correlation. The efficiency of unidirectional transshipments can be significant
for both locations simultaneously, especially for a medium transshipment price (see Figure 4(b)).
5.2 Coordinating contracts
Next, we analyse the risk pooling effect of unidirectional transshipment for the coordinating contracts discussed in Section 4.
Figure 5(a) shows the set of transshipment price and leftover subsidy (r L∗21 , τ L∗) given in Equations (13) and (14) that
coordinates unidirectional transshipments varying with respect to ρ. Figure 5(b) illustrates the set of transshipment price and
shortage subsidy (r S∗21 , τ S∗). Although not significant, both r L∗21 and τ L∗ increase as shortage cost of location 1 increases.
Further, both r L∗21 and τ L∗ decrease with increasing ρ since the risk pooling effect decreases and, as a consequence, the optimal
order quantity of location 1 (location 2) increases (decreases). Unlike under the leftover subsidy contract, r S∗21 increases and
τ S∗ decrease with increasing ρ in the shortage subsidy contract, i.e. a decrease in the risk pooling effect implies that the
transshipment price should increase while the shortage subsidy should decrease. Note that as ρ approaches 1, the resulting
subsidy terms τ S∗ and τ L∗ approach zero (Proposition 4.11).
The impact of increasing demand correlation on the locations individual profits is shown in Figure 6. While the leftover
subsidy contract is always beneficial for location 2 (see Corollary 4.3), it may be suboptimal for location 1 (the transshipment
receiver). Location 1 would not take this contract for large ρ since the risk pooling benefit would be overweighted by the
subsidy that he has to pay for location 2s leftovers. For the parameters used in Figure 6(a) this corresponds to a coefficient of
correlation ρ = 0. However, it changes based on the problem setting, for example, it increases with increasing transshipment
cost. Conversely to the leftover subsidy, the shortage subsidy contract is always beneficial for location 1 (see Corollary 4.6),
while it is suboptimal for location 2 if ρ increases (see Figure 6(b)).
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Figure 4. Profit increase from transshipments varying demand correlation ρ.
Finally, Figure 7 illustrates the impact of increasing demand correlation on the individual profits of the transshipment
receiver and giver and the total profit compared to the newsvendor profits. Figure 7(a) and (b) show the results of all three
coordinating contracts leftover subsidy, shortage subsidy and a combination of leftover and shortage subsidy for different
transshipment prices if feasible, in case that both locations would take the contract (i.e. i ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2). For comparison
we also illustrate the results of a price-only contract for different transshipment prices, which does not coordinate the supply
chain. From Figure 7(c) we see that the benefit from coordination is significant, especially if the demand correlations is not
that high. Further, a combined contract with leftover and shortage subsidy is a reasonable contract that coordinates the supply
chain and that is optimal for both locations for all ranges of demand correlation (Proposition 4.10). The other coordinating
contracts may not allow both locations to benefit from coordinating transshipments, especially when the risk pooling effect is
small (i.e. demand correlation is high). However, as correlation becomes highly positive, it is known that risk pooling cannot
contribute to the system profit significantly (see Figure 7(c)). Therefore, it will depend on the demand correlation between
the locations but also other factors like bargaining power which contract to choose in the specific setting.
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Figure 5. Coordinating transshipment price and leftover subsidy (a), shortage subsidy (b) varying demand correlation ρ.
Figure 6. Comparison of newsvendor profit and profit under coordinating leftover subsidy contract (a) and shortage subsidy contract (b)
varying demand correlation ρ.
6. Extension to multiple locations
In this section we present a brief extension to a setting with N ≥ 2 locations, some of which are transshipment givers and
the others are transshipment receivers. Locations as i = 1, ...,G are transshipment givers and the locations j = 1, ..., R are
transshipment receivers, where G + R = N .
Analysing such a system with more than two decentralised agents is known to be a nontrivial task (Huang and Sošic´
2010; Rudi, Kapur, and Pyke 2001; Shao, Krishnan, and McCormick 2011). First of all an allocation rule has to be defined
for assigning the leftovers to retailers with shortages. The amount of total shortages which can be potentially covered by
transshipments is T S =∑Rj=1(X j − Q j )+, and the amount of total leftover stocks which can be used for transshipments is
T L =∑Gi=1(Qi − Xi )+.
For simplicity we assume symmetric locations in terms of their cost and demand parameters, and we adopt a proportional
allocation rule suggested by Huang and Sošic´ (2010). Under this rule the quantity that locations j receives via transshipments
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [W
U 
Vi
en
na
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
5:3
9 1
3 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
14 E. Arikan and L. Silbermayr
Figure 7. Profit increase compared to newsvendor profit for different contract types varying demand correlation ρ.
is T I j = min(T L , T S)(X j − Q j )+/T S. The first term, min(T L , T S), is the total amount which can be exchanged through
transshipments. This term is multiplied with the proportion of locations j’s shortages to the total shortages. Similarly, the
quantity that locations i transships out is T Oi = min(T L , T S)(Qi − Xi )+/T L . Sales for transshipment givers and receivers
are Si = min(Di , Qi ) and S j = min(Di , Qi )+T I j , leftovers Li = (Qi−Di )+−T Oi and L j = (Q j−Dj )+ and unsatisfied
demands Pi = (Di − Qi )+ and Pj = (Dj − Q j )+ − T I j .
We assume transshipment prices and transshipment costs do not depend on i and j , otherwise, we need to keep track of
which giver sends to which receiver, so ri j = rt and ci j = ct for all i, j . The expected profits incurred by location i (giver)
and j (receiver) are

G,R
i (Qi, Qj) = E(ri Si + (ri j − ci j )T Oi − ci Qi + (si + τ L)Li − pi Pi − τ S
⎛
⎝∑
j
Pj )/G
⎞
⎠ , (29)

G,R
j (Qi, Qj) = E
(
r j S j − ri j T I j − c j Q j + s j L j − τ L
(∑
i
Li
)
/R −
(
p j − τ S
)
Pj
)
. (30)
(Qi, Qj) is the vector of order quantities. Note that if τ L = τ S = 0 we have the price-only contract.
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Figure 8. Profit increase from transshipments with price only contract compared to newsvendor varying demand correlation ρ, N =
3, rt = 24.
The total centralised profit is
G,RC (Qi, Qj) = E
( R∑
j=1
(r j S j − c j Q j + s j L j − p j Pj )
+
G∑
i=1
(ri Si − ci Qi + si Li − pi Pi ) − ct min(T L , T S)
)
. (31)
Since the locations are symmetric, under the proportional allocation rule, the transshipment givers have the same
equilibrium order quantities QG,Ri , QG,RCi , and consequently the same expected profit. Similarly, all transshipment receivers
have the same equilibrium quantities QG,Rj , QG,RCj and expected profit.
We numerically investigate a system with N = 3 for the case of (i) G = 1 giver and R = 2 receivers and (ii) G = 2
givers and R = 2 receiver. From Figure 8 we see that the analytical results of Section 3 also hold for more than two locations.
That is, the price-only contract does not coordinate the supply chain (see Figure 8(b)). However, as illustrated in Figure
8(a), unidirectional transshipments are beneficial for all locations, i.e. transshipment givers and receivers. These benefits are
decreasing in demand correlation. Further, they depend on the number of locations that are givers and receivers, respectively.
For example, ifG increases the profit of i decreases as i’s transshipment opportunities increase, while the opposite holds for j .
Comparing Figure 8(a) with Figure 4(b) we can directly see the impact of N on the locations’profits for a fixed transshipment
price, i.e. the individual profits of givers and receivers increase with N and the number of transshipment givers G. Note that
we assume symmetric demand correlation between the individual locations. As we have to ensure that the correlations matrix
is positive semi-definite we can only analyse cases with ρ ≥ −0.5 for N = 3.
Our numerical experiments for N > 2 also confirm that the coordinating contracts of leftover subsidy, shortage subsidy
and a combination of leftover and shortage subsidy might not be beneficial for all location as discussed for N = 2 in Section 4.
However, also for N > 2 we are able to find feasible coordinating contacts which are beneficial for all locations (Proposition
4.10). This is illustrated in Figure 9: for a τ L around 3 the supply chain is coordinated and taking this contract is beneficial
for giver i and receiver j .
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we consider optimal transshipment policies with two locations in a decentralised setting when transshipments
can be performed only unidirectional taking into consideration the positive and negative demand dependence between the
locations. We analyse the performance of unidirectional transshipments and compare it with the performance of both, a
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Figure 9. Order quantities and profit increase from contract with a combination of leftover and shortage subsidy varying τ L , N = 3,
G = 2, R = 1, τ S = 10, rt = 19, ρ = 0.
traditional channel and a channel with bidirectional transshipments. In general, we observe that the differences between
uni- and bidirectional systems and the traditional channel decrease as demand correlation increases. Further, we find that
in comparison with the traditional channel the benefits of unidirectional transshipments can be significant for both the
transshipment giver and receiver simultaneously, especially for medium transshipment prices.
For a system with unidirectional transshipments, we prove the existence of unique Nash equilibrium and show that the
decentralised system cannot be coordinated by varying the transshipment price. Compared to the centralised system, the
transshipment receiver orders too much while the transshipment giver orders too few. In order to enable coordination in this
unidirectional setting we propose simple and easy to implement mechanisms by including a leftover and/or shortage subsidy
to the contract. A subsidy on leftover inventories of the transshipment giver or a subsidy on shortages of the transshipment
receiver allows for coordination in the system, i.e. gaining the highest supply chain profits. Our results show that one of
the locations may prefer not taking this contract, especially when demands are highly positively correlated such that the
potential benefits of risk pooling are small. We show that coordination can be also achieved through another subsidy contract
that combines both leftover and shortage subsidy and that this combined contract is beneficial for both locations and every
correlation level. Moreover, we demonstrate the relevance of coordinating unidirectional transshipments, especially when
demand correlation is not that high.
Finally, we propose potential extensions to this work. An interesting research opportunity is to study possible mechanisms
for fairly sharing the benefits of coordination under unidirectional transshipments. Additionally, other tools, such as options
contracts and revenue sharing agreements, can be studied in this setting or a cooperative game theoretic framework could be
analysed.
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Appendix 1.
Proof of Proposition 3.1 By implicit differentiation of (7) and (8) we can derive
∂Qu1(Q2)
∂Q2
= −
(r1 − r21 + p1)gDn1 (Q1)
(r21 + s1) fD1(Q1) + (r1 − r21 + p1) fDn1 (Q1)
(A1)
and
∂Qu2(Q1)
∂Q1
= −
(r21 − c21 − s2)gDe2 (Q2)
(r2 + p2 − r21 + c21) fD2(Q2) + (r21 − c21 − s2) fDe2 (Q2)
, (A2)
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where fDe2 (Q2) = ∂FDe2 (Q2)/∂Q2 and gDe2 (Q2) = ∂FDe2 (Q2)/∂Q1, and similarly for D
n
1 . From the definitions of effective and net
demand, we know that FDe2 (Q2) ≤ FD2(Q2) and FD1(Q1) ≤ FDn1 (Q1). Using these properties it can be shown that fDe2 (Q2) ≥ gDe2 (Q2)
and fDn1 (Q1) ≥ gDn1 (Q1). As a result, it follows that −1 ≤ ∂Q2/∂Q1 ≤ 0 and −1 ≤ ∂Q1/∂Q2 ≤ 0. That is, the slopes of the best
response functions are less than one, which is sufficient for a unique Nash equilibrium. 
Proof of Corollary 3.2 The left-hand side of Equation (3) is larger than that of Equation (7) for all (Q1, Q2). Hence, the left-hand side
of Equation (7) evaluated at Qb1(Q2) is smaller than zero. Since it is a decreasing function of Q1 in order to satisfy the equality at zero,
Qu1(Q2) has to be set larger than Qb1(Q2), i.e. Qb1(Q2) ≥ Qu1(Q2). Following the same line of argument it can be shown that the opposite
holds true for Q2, i.e. Qb2(Q1) ≤ Qu2(Q1). 
Proof of Proposition 3.3 We look at the first-order conditions of the unidirectional system at the optimal bidirectional equilibrium order
quantities. For part (i) the left-hand side of Equations (7) and (8) evaluated at (Qb1, Qb2) turns out to be strictly smaller and greater than
zero, respectively. Note that both equations are decreasing in Q1 and Q2. Additionally, for (7), the impact of a change in Q1 is stronger
compared to the impact of Q2, i.e. ∂
2u1
∂Q1∂Q2 ≤
∂2u1
∂(Qu1)2
which also leads to −1 ≤ ∂Q
u
1(Q2)
∂Q2 ≤ 0 as discussed in Proposition 3.1. As a
result when Q1 decreases and Q2 increases then the left-hand side of Equation (7) increases. A similar analysis follows for (7). Therefore,
in order to satisfy the two first-order conditions simultaneously Q1 has to be decreased, i.e. Qu1 < Qb1 and Q2 has to be increased, i.e.
Qu2 > Qb2. We can conclude similarly for part (ii). 
Proof of Proposition 3.4 Note that the left-hand side of Equation (7) evaluated at the optimal centralised order quantities (QuC1 , QuC2 )
turns out to be greater than or equal to zero, while the same for Equation (8) is smaller than or equal to zero. The rest follows similar to
Proposition 3.3, in order to satisfy the two first-order conditions simultaneously Q1 has to be increased and Q2 has to be decreased. 
Proof of Proposition 4.2 It is sufficient to look for the transshipment price and leftover subsidy which would make the two locations
order the optimal centralised order quantities. We can conclude by equating the left-hand sides of Equations (11) and (12) with (5) and
(6), respectively. 
Proof of Corollary 4.3 The difference between the profits of location two with transshipments under leftover subsidy and without
transshipments is L2 (Q1, Q2) − NV2 (Q1, Q2) = (r21 − c21 − s2)E(T21) + τ L E(L2) which is larger than or equal to zero since we
assume r21 ≥ c21 + s2. 
Proof of Propostion 4.11 When ρ = 1, we have D2 = aD1+bwith probability one for some constants a > 0, and b. For Q2 ≤ aQ1+b,
FDn1 (Q1) = FD1(Q1) and FDe2 (Q2) = FD2(Q2) since there is no chance of making transshipments. On the other hand for Q2 ≥ aQ1+b,
there is a positive probability of having transshipments which implies FDn1 (Q1) > FD1(Q1) and FDe2 (Q2) < FD2(Q2).
For part (i), the costs are symmetric, or they are asymmetric such that cr2 ≤ cr1, then QNV2 ≤ aQNV1 + b. Then FDn1 (Q
NV
1 ) =
FD1(QNV1 ) = r1−c1+p1r1−s1+p1 and FDe2 (Q
NV
2 ) = FD2(QNV2 ) = r2−c2+p2r2−s2+p2 . This implies, the first-order conditions (5) and (6), and (7) and (8)
are satisfied at (QNV1 , QNV2 ).
For part (ii), the costs are asymmetric such that cr2 > cr1 then QNV2 > aQNV1 + b. This implies that (5) and (7) are negative and (6)
and (8) are positive at (QNV1 , QNV2 ), i.e. Q1 should be decreased and Q2 should be increased to satisfy the first-order conditions.
When ρ = −1 it is never simultaneously possible that FDn1 (Q1) = FD1(Q1) and FDe2 (Q2) = FD2(Q2). We always have either
FDn1 (Q1) > FD1(Q1) or FDe2 (Q2) < FD2(Q2), or both inequalities hold at the same time. The rest follows as for part (ii). 
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